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Abstract
Through its recommendations, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has
helped the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) introduce regulations that have helped to
curtail icing accidents1 (an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft where as a
result of the operation of an aircraft, any person receives fatal or serious injury or any aircraft
receives substantial damage) and incidents1 (an occurrence, other than an accident, associated
with the operation of an aircraft that affects or could affect the safety of operations). However,
"the only acceptable safety goal of zero accident," proposed by former Secretary of
Transportation, Federico Fabian Pena, has not materialized. The aviation industry each year
experiences more accidents and incidents. Steven D. Green of Flight Operations Research,
Underhill, Vermont, researched US inflight icing accidents and incidents from 1978 to 2005.3
Using the NTSB online database, he observed that 645 accidents and incidents occurred in the
US from 1978 to 2005. He identified another 299 incidents in the NASA Aviation Safety
Reporting System (ASRS) reports during the same period. The purpose of this thesis is to update
and expand upon Mr. Green's research by studying US inflight icing accidents and incidents
from 2006 to 2010. The NTSB and ASRS databases were respectively, the primary means of
obtaining accident and incident reports. The databases revealed 228 icing related accidents and
30 inflight icing related incidents from 2006 to 2010. Forty of the accidents were related to
inflight icing occurring on the wings, fuselage or control surfaces.
From all of the reports sampled it was determined that an aircraft in cruise is more likely
to accrete ice than in any other phase of flight. Furthermore, aircraft in cruise are more prone to
V

inflight icing during instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) than in visual meteorological
conditions (VMC). Throughout this report there did not appear to be a direct correlation between
the number of flights and inflight icing accidents or incidents. Additionally, it was determined
that icing events depended more upon the ice protection system (IPS) equipment, its use and
effectiveness, as well as the management of ice accretion by the aircrew.
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CHAPTER 1
1.1 Introduction and General Information
Inflight icing accidents have been catastrophic to the aviation industry. The most recent
commercial fatal icing accident in the US occurred at Clarence Center, New York, on February
12, 2009. Fifty souls were lost in this accident involving a Colgan Air Inc. Bombardier DHC-8400 operating as Continental Flight 3407. Other deadly accidents have also occurred over the
years. On January 9, 1997, the Embraer EMB-12RT collided with terrain at Monroe, Michigan,
killing 27 people. Similarly, the Avions de Transport Regional ART – 72 collided with terrain at
Roselawn, Indiana, killing 68 people. Twenty seven people perished in the Fokker 28-4000 (F28) accident on March 22, 1992, in Flushing, New York. In 1987, an icing related accident at
Denver, Colorado involving a McDonnell Douglas DC – 9 – 14 aircraft killed 28 people.
These accidents and others have generated considerable interest into researching inflight
icing accidents. The NTSB is the primary repository of inflight icing accident reports. NASA's
ASRS is also a repository of inflight icing related incidents. Although the ASRS reports are not
investigated to check the veracity of the claims, the reports help to understand the aircrews’
actions as they encounter icing conditions.
The results of icing related accident studies have had a great influence in the
improvement of aviation safety. These results have led to the introduction of IPS and de-icing
fluids, and to the development of regulation changes. Among the changes are rules specifying
procedures for airspeed, and flaps selection in icing conditions.9
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Meteorological forecasts over the years have not always been reliable. Pilots sometimes
encounter unpredicted icing conditions en route which put them in dangerous situations. The
introduction of the IPS has helped to drastically reduce the intensity of icing accidents, but the
best way to avoid icing accidents has been avoidance of icing conditions. However, with the ever
increasing demand for air transportation and scheduled flights, avoidance cannot always be
relied upon. The IPS, although very useful, has not been able to completely overcome inflight
icing accidents. Some aircraft equipped with IPS and certified to fly in moderate icing conditions
encounter inflight icing that their IPS cannot shed, and, therefore, must request a climb or
descent out of the icing conditions from air traffic controllers (ATC).
The most common experience that aircraft encounter in icing conditions are performance
degradation, loss of control and stall. These events (defined in section 2.25) do not necessarily
occur in chronological order. Depending on the icing severity, the aircraft can experience loss of
control or stall that can lead to collision with terrain or a hard landing. Steven D. Green of Flight
Operations Research, Underhill, Vermont, researched inflight icing accidents and incidents from
1978 to 2005.3 He observed that aircraft’s scale is more significant to icing events than pilot
training, pilot experience, icing equipment and icing certification. This is because different
categories of aircraft react differently to ice accretion. The effects of moderate icing (icing with
rate of accumulation of 1 to 3 inches (2.5 to 7.5 cm) per hour5) on the flying characteristics of a
twin turboprop engine with 50 + seats will be different than a single reciprocating engine with 1
to 4 seats. He also came to the conclusion that icing events are prevalent at near freezing
temperatures and ceilings of one thousand feet or less. These conditions have moisture contents
conducive to airframe icing.
2

This thesis was carried out to build upon Mr. Green's work and update the US inflight
icing accidents and incidents from 2006 to 2010. The study takes into account geographic
distribution of the accidents using the FAA’s regional zoning 6, meteorological properties, pilot's
experience, IPS usage, and event sequence by aircraft scale based on the General Aviation Air
Taxi Activity (GAATA) scale index10 shown in Table 1 (all tables shown in appendix I).
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CHAPTER 2
2.1 Methodology and Data Collection
The NTSB Accidents and Synopses online database1 is the primary source of information
for this study. All of the accidents studied in this report were retrieved from the NTSB online
database. This database can be accessed through the web address www.ntsb.gov. A series of
search strings were used to query the NTSB database. Starting with the dates (January 1, 2006 to
December 31, 2010), the database yielded 9361 accidents. To narrow the sample space to icing
related accidents, the string “icing” was introduced in the narrative cell of the database. This
search yielded 292 accidents. After reading the synopses of these accidents, it was discovered
that some of the reports were related to pre-taxi de-icing. The remaining accidents were then
filtered to eliminate all accidents that were not related to inflight icing. This reduced the sample
space to 228 accidents. The accidents which were caused by carburetor icing or engine failure
were also filtered out. Other strings such as “ice", "snow", "rime", "freezing", and "frost” were
used; however, these strings yielded fewer accidents than the “icing” search revealed. These
accidents were also filtered to include those that were not captured by the "icing" string. Forty
inflight icing accidents (shown in the appendix) were found to have experienced performance or
aerodynamic stability and control events such as stall, loss of control or performance, hard
landing, etc., which were not a result of engine failure or carburetor icing. These accidents
occurred when the aircraft flew in icing conditions and ice accreted on the wings, fuselage,
windshield or control surfaces of the aircraft.
The NASA ASRS2 was also searched with the strings “ice% OR icing% OR freeze% OR
rime% OR glaze% OR sleet% OR frost%“. This yielded 1221 incident reports. These report's
4

synopses were reviewed and those that did not experience any performance or aerodynamic
stability and control events mentioned above were omitted. For instance, the string “snow”
mostly yielded reports about incidents that occurred when there was snow on the runway.
Finally, the synopses and narratives yielded 30 incidents which involved inflight icing leading to
performance or aerodynamic stability and control event. The incident reports from the ASRS are
discussed separately from the NTSB, since the ASRS reports are not investigated to prove or
disprove the claims. This makes the ASRS reports highly subjective. However, the ASRS reports
help to understand the incidents from the pilot’s perspective, and offer a glimpse at how the
inflight situations were managed during the ice accretion period.
2.2 Development of Data
The final database consists of accidents and incidents that were found to have
experienced performance or aerodynamic stability and control events. The synopses and
narratives of the accidents and incidents were carefully studied to identify the trend of the
aerodynamic events occurred. Among these trends are uncontrolled descent, high sink rate, loss
of control, performance degradation, and stall. The final database includes all accidents and
incidents for which these performance and aerodynamic stability and control events occurred as
a result of inflight icing on wings, fuselage, windshield or control surfaces. It involves accidents
and incidents that accreted ice from initial climb to the landing phase of the flight. Since the
focus of this thesis is inflight icing, accidents and incidents which resulted from taxi and take off
icing were not considered in this study. During incidents in general, the pilots were able to regain
control and either continued the flight to the destination or diverted to a nearby airport for an
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emergency landing. However, the accidents typically resulted in stall and inflight collision with
terrain or water.
2.21 Meteorology
Meteorological information about temperature, dew point, visibility, wind speed, wind
direction, and surface precipitation type were extracted from the reports. The phase of the flight
that the pilot or air crew recognized ice accretion was also extracted; however, the exact point
during the flight that ice accretion started could not be determined by the investigators. In some
reports the pilots were able to estimate the thickness of the ice, while some were determined after
the accident. The latter measurements are rough estimates as it takes time for investigators to
reach the accident site and determine the thickness of ice accretion. Contamination of these
measurements can occur by either sublimation due to temperature difference resulting in less ice
accretion than experienced inflight or additional ice formation resulting in more ice accretion
than experienced inflight. Some accidents involved post accident fires therefore, the thickness of
ice that was accreted inflight could not be determined.
2.22 Pilot Experience
Pilot experience was also extracted to determine the pilot’s total flight hours and flight
hours in the aircraft model/type with which the accident or incident occurred. This was analyzed
by aircraft’s scale index (GAATA scale index)10 and certification (FAR Parts 91, 121 and 135).
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2.23 Aircraft Analysis by Scale
Data was collected about the type of aircraft involved in the accidents. These aircraft were
classified based of the number of engines and seating capacity. The FAR Part under which the
aircraft were operating was also extracted from the reports. The General Aviation Air Taxi
Activity scale index10 used by the FAA in the 2002 survey was used to classify the aircraft as
shown in Table 1. The GAATA scale index covers up to civilian aircraft with 13 + seats, so the
modified scale index 3 was used to cover larger civilian aircraft.
2.24 Aircraft Analysis by IPS Certification
The FAA permits aircraft equipped with ice protection systems to operate in light icing
conditions (icing with 1/4 inch to one inch (0.6 to 2.5 cm) rate of accumulation per hour). Data
was therefore collected about the aircraft’s IPS status. Those equipped with IPS were also
considered whether the systems were operated during the ice accretion period or not. There is a
dearth of information about the IPS status of some of the aircraft because some reports never
state whether they were equipped or activated. Mr. Green3 observed that in the cases that the
IPSs were operated, there was no information to determine whether it was operated correctly.
2.25 Aerodynamic Stability and Control (ASC) Events
Performance and ASC events contributed to the inclusion or exclusion of an accident or
incident for the discussion. Performance degradation, loss of control, stall, high sink rate, and
hard landing were the primary events that were used for the discussion. The accidents were
classified based on the following occurrences:3
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Loss of control: The occurrence in which an uncontrolled descent was cited as the
final flight phase. “In order to enter an uncontrolled descent, control must be
lost”.3



Stall: The occurrence in which loss of control was cited or added and no
preceding aerodynamic event was found; “if the loss of control resulted from ice
accretion, then some type of flow separation must have occurred."3



Loss of Performance: The occurrence in which insufficient performance was
retained to avoid an inflight collision with terrain, water or obstacles, but no
indication was present of either a stall or loss of control.



High Sink Rate: Events that terminated with a hard landing within the intended
touchdown zone assuming no other aerodynamic event was found.

2.26 Regional Distribution of Events
The FAA has zoned the United States into nine regions: Alaska, Central, Eastern, Great
Lakes, New England, Northwest Mountain, Southern, Southwest, and West-Pacific regions. The
accidents were classified under these regions to develop a regional distribution of accidents in
the US. The flight concentration in these regions were based on the total flight hours and
compared with the number of accident(s) per state in the region. The location of the incidents
from ASRS could not be determined because the reports do not state where they occurred.
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CHAPTER 3
3.1 Five Most Fatal Contemporary Icing Accidents
The aviation industry over the years has suffered many catastrophic accidents as a result
of icing. Notable among them is the Colgan Air flight at Clarence Center, New York; Comair
flight at Monroe, Michigan; American Eagle flight at Roselawn, Indiana; USAIR flight at
Flushing, New York; and Continental flight at Denver, Colorado. To bring into bare an extent of
damages icing accidents had caused, this chapter presents the five most catastrophic icing
accidents involving commercial US flights.
3.11 Colgan Air Inc. Accident at Clarence Center, New York
On Feb 12, 2009, the Bombardier Inc DHC – 8 – 402 twin engine aircraft impacted the
ground at 22:17 EST. Four crew members and 45 passengers aboard the aircraft were killed in
addition to one person on the ground. The aircraft was on an instrument approach to BuffaloNiagara International Airport (KBUF) in Buffalo, New York, but crashed into a residence in
Clarence Center, New York, about 5 nautical miles northeast of the airport.
The NTSB report1 stated that “Colgan Air’s inadequate procedure for airspeed selection
and management during approaches in icing conditions” were among the probable causes of the
accident. The aircraft was equipped with ice detection system on the fuselage, wings, tails,
propellers, windshield and the pilot and copilot’s window. The ice detection parameter in the
cockpit was programmed to show “detected” when there was ice accumulation and “not
detected” after the ice was completely shed. From 22:07:53 to 22:08:58, 22:09:21 to 22:11:05
and 22:11:17 to 22:12:17 the ice parameter indicator changed from “not detected” to “detected”
then back to “not detected”. It also changed from “not detected” to “detected” from 2216:25 until
the end of the recording. Although these indications are very useful for airspeed selection in
9

icing conditions, they do not adequately inform pilots as to when to activate the IPS. The Flight
crew’s workload management also contributed to this accident. NTSB1 stated that the captain
inappropriately responded to the activation of the stick shaker and also failed to monitor the
airspeed which resulted in stall. Furthermore, the flight crew also failed to observe the sterile
cockpit procedures.
3.12 Embraer EMB – 120RT Accident at Monroe, Michigan
On January 9, 1997, the Embraer EMB – 120RT twin engine aircraft operated by
COMAIR, INC impacted the ground on approach to runway 3R at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne
County Airport (KDTW). The accident occurred approximately 19 nautical miles southwest of
the airport killing 3 flight crew and 26 passengers aboard the aircraft. This accident also resulted
in a post crash fire. The NTSB1 investigation revealed that it was likely that the aircraft had
gradually accumulated a thin rough glaze/mixed ice coverage on the leading edge deicing boot
surfaces as it descended from 7000ft MSL to 4000ft MSL through icing conditions. The
investigation also stated that the pilot might not have been aware of the icing conditions and that
the “FAA’s failure to require the establishment of adequate minimum airspeed for icing
conditions”1 was a probable cause of the accident.
3.13 America Eagle Airline Accident at Roselawn, Indiana
An inflight icing accident involving the twin engine ATR – 72 -212 occurred on October
31, 1994, at Roselawn, Indiana. The aircraft en route to Chicago, Illinois, was in a holding
pattern for sequencing into Chicago's O'Hare Airport (KORD). Upon clearance to descend from
10000ft to a newly assigned altitude of 8000ft, it rolled approximately 70 degrees right wing
down followed by a rapid descent and crashed into the ground. Attempt by the aircrew to recover
the airplane from the initial roll proved futile. Among the probable causes cited by the NTSB1
10

was ice accretion beyond the de-ice boots while the airplane was in a holding pattern, which
resulted in loss of control. Four crew members and 64 passengers aboard the aircraft were killed.
3.14 USAIR INC. Accident at Flushing, New York
Another fatal icing related accident occurred on March 22, 1992, which caused the death
of 2 crew members and 25 passengers. However, twenty three people including one crew
member survived the accident with serious and minor injuries. The accident involved a twin
engine Fokker - 28 – 4000 aircraft. The aircraft was de-iced twice before leaving the gate, but
there was a 35 minute holding period between the second de-icing and take off. The NTSB1
report states that the 35 minutes exceeded the 11 minutes safe holding period for the type 1 deicing fluid used. The aircraft accumulated ice under the wing during this time interval, which
was unnoticed by the pilot. The aircraft collided with the terrain right after takeoff from Flushing
Airport (KLGA), New York.
3.15 Continental Airlines Inc. Accident at Denver, Colorado
On November 15, 1987, an inflight icing related accident occurred at Denver, Colorado,
Stapleton International Airport now Denver International Airport (KDEN), involving a
McDonnell Douglas DC – 9 – 14 aircraft. Among the probable causes of the accident reported by
the NTSB1 was the accumulation of ice on the lifting surfaces. The aircraft was de-iced but there
was a 27 minute delay between final de-icing and takeoff. The aircraft is believed to have
accumulated ice on the lifting surfaces during the 27 minutes between de-icing and take off. This
accident resulted in 28 fatalities and 54 serious and minor injuries.
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CHAPTER 4
4.1 Results and Discussion
Steven Green3 observed that aircraft are more prone to icing events under IMC than
VMC from 1978 to 2005. Out of the 40 accidents from 2006 to 2010, 21 occurred under IMC,
while 19 occurred under VMC. One would have expected the IMC accidents to have greatly
exceeded that of the VMC, but the IMC accidents exceed the VMC accidents to 2. Intuitively,
pilots and air crew are more vigilant for icing when flying under IMC. The FAA GAATA
survey10 is a repository of aircraft exposure to IMC, VMC and total hours of flight for general
aviation and part 135 aircraft. The 2009 GAATA survey is the most current data available. Out
of approximately 98.6 million total flight hours from 2006 to 2009, 86% were under VMC with
the remaining 14% under IMC. This might be the reason why the VMC accidents amount almost
to the same number as the IMC accidents. Although flights under IMC comparatively
contributed to a smaller percentage of the total flight hours, it also contributed to the greater
percentage of the number of accidents. This means that aircraft are more prone to inflight icing
under IMC than VMC. This is not to trivialize the need for aircrew to be on the lookout for icing
under VMC, since a lot of inflight icing accidents have occurred under VMC.
The 1 to 3 seats and 1 to 4+ seats categories based on the GAATA scale index,
contributed to the greatest number of hours under VMC. These aircraft are typically not
equipped with IPS and ostensibly do avoid flying under IMC. However, due to occasional
uncertainty in weather forecasts, some of these aircraft end up in IMC even after filing VMC
flight plans. Mr. Green3 observed that from 1978 to 2005, the 1 to 3 seats scale accounted for the
least amount of total flight time under IMC exposure. This scale of aircraft, he explained, are
12

single engine aircraft such as Cessna 150 which typically do not have the equipment to fly in
IMC. He also observed that IMC exposure increased with increase in aircraft size. This was also
the trend from 2006 to 2010. Larger aircraft, such as the 7+seats and above, are typically
equipped with an IPS and pilots who have extensive training and flight experience under IMC.
As much as 50% of the accidents occurred when there was no surface precipitation at the
accident site. Snow and rain contributed 10% each. Freezing rain, freezing drizzle, ice pellets and
ice crystal contributed 2.5% each, while the remaining 20% occurred under unknown surface
precipitation. From 1978 to 2005, Mr. Green3 observed that freezing precipitation and snow
accounted for 33% and 32% respectively of inflight icing accidents. These values would be more
useful if there were ways to determine the type of precipitation that the accident aircraft went
through from the period prior to ice accretion, and the occurrence of the first performance or
aerodynamic stability and control event prior to the accident. Unfortunately, the current state of
the art is not capable of providing this data. ICEPRO7 software although yet to be integrated into
transport aircraft, is purported to have the capability to inform aircrew of particular inflight icing
conditions, icing severity, and how these icing conditions may alter the aircraft’s baseline
performance, and stability and control. The surface precipitation data does little to explain
exactly what the aircraft went through inflight before the accident. It is possible for an aircraft to
accumulate inflight icing in an area with little or no precipitation, but end up stalling and
crashing at a place with entirely different surface precipitation. Figure 1 (all figures shown in
appendix II) shows the statistical display of the surface precipitation data.
Statistical display of the meteorological parameters is shown in Table 2. In order to
calculate the percentiles the temperatures were converted from degree Celsius to degree
13

Fahrenheit to avoid distortions by negative numbers. Fifty percent of the accidents occurred
under a ceiling of 1600ft. From 1978 to 2005 Mr. Green3 observed that aircraft are more prone to
icing under a 1000ft ceiling. This is because near surface ceilings typically have moisture
contents that support inflight icing.
Approximately 62% of the accidents occurred at surface temperature greater than 0oC,
while 38% occurred at surface temperature less than or equal to 0 oC. All of the accidents
occurred between +21oC and -21oC (surface temperature). Although the scope of the study is
only 5 years, it can be inferred from this data that inflight icing is less likely to occur at surface
temperatures greater than 21oC since inflight icing occurs only at freezing temperature. From
1978 to 2005, Mr. Green developed a typical icing surface interquartile model (Table 3) for the
above meteorological parameters. The 1st quartile or 25th percentile, interquartile means (IQM),
and 3rd quartile respectively represent 25%, 50% and 75% of the events. This is more useful
since it covers many years and therefore, aircrews can expect icing when flying under these
conditions.
Steven Green stated in his publication, “A study of U.S. Inflight Icing Accidents, 1978 to
2002. AIAA 2006 – 82,” that “a reported visibility of 2 to 5 miles would not appear to be
problematic”; however, 84% of the accidents from 2006 to 2010 occurred with reported visibility
of 3 to 10 miles with 84% of those occurring under reported visibility from 5 to 10 miles. This is
to say that although flying under VFR might not seem problematic as Steven3 explains, aircraft
are equally prone to inflight icing accidents under VFR as IFR depending on inflight temperature
and moisture content.
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Out of approximately 81 million total flight hours from 2006 to 2009, 53% was under
IFR. The single reciprocating engine with 4 or more seats based on GAATA scale index
contributed to 42.5% of the accidents. These aircraft are typically not certified to fly under icing
conditions. As discussed in the incidents reports obtained from the ASRS, some pilots file for
VFR but inadvertently end up in IFR which in most cases depending on pilot experience and IPS
equipment, lead to a decision to land at a nearby airport. Sixteen out of the 17 single
reciprocating engine aircraft with 4 or more seats operated under FAA Part 91 at the time of the
accident as general aviation aircraft. This was expected because these aircraft were either not
equipped with IPS or there was no information about their IPS status. These aircraft are generally
not certified to fly under icing conditions. For research purposes the NTSB report will be more
informative if the IPS status of every accident/incident aircraft is explicitly stated.
The 20 to 50 and 50+ twin turboprop engine aircraft and the single reciprocal engine
aircraft (1 to 3 seats) contributed to the least number of accidents as shown in Table 4. This is not
surprising since the single reciprocal engine aircraft are not certified to fly under icing
conditions. The 20 to 50 and 50+ twin turboprop engine aircraft operate under FAA Part 121: air
carrier, and are required to have IPS. Since its introduction, IPS has helped commercial flight
operators mitigate icing related hazards since the avoidance of icing conditions cannot be relied
upon. However, there have been instances where the IPS has failed to operate or operated
without shedding all accreted ice. Steven Green3 noted that when IPS’ were operated there was
no information to determine whether they were operated correctly or at the right time and/or
duration. Aircraft with manual IPS are operated solely by the judgment of the aircrew. The
NTSB reports on aircraft equipped with IPS do not provide information about how the IPS was
15

operated. Some reports also do not state whether the accident aircraft was equipped with IPS.
From Figure 3 the status of the IPS equipment was unknown for 22 of the accidents.
FAA introduced new regulations on August 3, 2009 that changed the certification
standards for transport category airplanes. However, the new rules apply only to new transport
aircraft designs. It fails to address transport aircraft in existence prior to August 3, 2009.
According to the FAA5, the new regulations state that new transport aircraft must incorporate
one of the following measures to detect icing and activate the IPS when flying under icing
conditions:
a. An ice detection system that automatically activates or alerts pilots to turn on the ice
protection system.
b. A definition of visual signs of ice buildup on a specified surface (e.g., wings) combined
with an advisory system that alerts the pilots to activate the ice protection system; or
c. Identification of temperature and moisture conditions conducive to airframe icing that
would tip off pilots to activate the ice protection system.
The standards further require that after initial activation, the ice protection system must operate
continuously, automatically turn on and off, or alert the pilots when the system should be cycled.
Although these new regulations are very important, they fail to address the old transport
aircraft that are still in operation. Some already have an ice detection system that alerts pilots
when there is ice accretion, but do not specify where on the aircraft that ice has accreted. There is
also no information about the thickness or type of ice accreted. The Feb 12, 2009, accident at
Clarence Center, New York, involved the Bombardier Inc DHC – 8 – 402 twin engine aircraft
that was equipped with an ice detection system on the fuselage, wings, tails, propellers,
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windshield and pilot and copilot’s window. The NTSB investigation revealed that the ice
detection parameter in the cockpit was programmed to show “detected” when there was ice
accumulation and “not detected” after the ice had been cleared. Between 2207:53 to 2208:58,
2209:21 to 2211:05 and 2211:17 to 2212:17, the ice parameter indicator changed from “not
detected” to “detected” then back to “not detected”. It also changed from “not detected” to
“detected” from 2216:25 to the end of the recording. However, the ice parameter indicator did
not tell the pilot the intensity of the accreted ice. Neither did it tell the pilot when to operate the
IPS. Without giving the pilot information on operating the IPS, the ice detected message only
becomes useful for airspeed selection. In this accident the pilot failed to monitor and eventually
stalled.
An aircraft in the cruise phase is more likely to accrete ice than any other phase. Ice
accretion in 40% of the accidents from 2006 to 2010 was detected during the cruise phase of the
flight. This is consistent with Steven Green's3 observations on inflight icing accidents from 1978
to 2005. The majority of the accident aircraft accreted ice during the cruise phase of the flight.
This should be expected since cruise forms the greater duration of most air transportation. Figure
2 shows the distribution of the number of events by the phase of flight.
Out of the 40 accidents, only 2 recovered from stall. Five resulted in hard landing, 18
resulted in inflight collision with terrain and 15 resulted in a ground collision with ground or
water. This is consistent with what Mr. Green observed from 1978 to 2005. Mr. Green observed
that 53% of the accidents resulted in inflight collision with terrain, while 3.08% and 23.82%
terminated in stall recovery and hard landing, respectively. Figure 4 shows the distribution of the
terminating events from 2006 to 2010.
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The research also considered the pilots total flight hours and the hours in the accident
aircraft model/type. This was done only for the pilot in command as there were no details about
the copilot’s flight experience. In 14 of the accidents, the pilot in command’s flight experience in
the type/model of aircraft was unknown. For research purposes, the total flight hours of the
captain and the first officer in type/model of the accident aircraft would be very useful. The box
and whiskers plot in Figure 5 shows the total flight hours for the scales of aircraft that
contributed to the greater number of the accidents. All the scales of aircraft in Figure 5 show
extreme values to the right. The lower part of the boxes, the middle line and the upper part
respectively represent the lower quartile (median of the lower half of the data), the median and
the upper quartile (median of the upper half of the data).
The FAA Part under which the aircraft were operating was also considered. Figure 6
shows that 80% of the accidents operated under FAA Part 91. 15% operated under Part 135,
while 5% operated under Part 121. The Part 91 aircraft by regulation9 are mostly prevented from
operating in moderate icing. These aircraft, personal and business/corporate flying jets ranging
from single engine with four seats through corporate jets, are most common in icing events,
Steven Green3 explained. He further explained that unlike Part 135 which demands considerable
amount of training of crew members, Part 91 does not but solely relies on the licensing
requirement applicable to all flights. Part 121 aircraft are mostly scheduled air carriers. These
aircraft are equipped with IPS hence their contribution to a smaller percentage of the accidents.
The Part 91 aircraft which contributed to 32 out of the 40 accidents also accounted for a
greater percentage of the total flight hours as show in Figure 7. The single reciprocal engine 1 to
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4 seats aircraft which operated under Part 91 contributed to approximately 39.5% of the total
flight hours. It’s therefore not surprising it contributed to 32 of the accidents.

The most common ASC events in the accidents were stall and loss of control. In most
reports, these events were explicitly stated. Stall was inferred from reports that cited loss of
control as the primary aerodynamic event without any other occurrence. From 1987 to 2005,
most accidents3 involved stall, which was followed by loss of control. This trend was expected as
inflight icing increases the stall speed; the Federal Aviation Regulations Aeronautical
Information Manual8 explains that inflight icing has a cumulative effect on the performance of
aircraft. It explains that inflight icing comes with reduced thrust, increased weight, loss of lift,
and increased drag. This results in increased stall speed and performance degradation. It further
explains that ½ inch of ice can reduce the lifting power of an aircraft by 50% and increase
frictional drag by the same amount. Figure 8 shows the distribution of primary performance and
ASC event. Twenty one (approximately 53%) of the accidents from 2006 to 2010 experienced
stall and loss of control.
The accidents were also classified using the FAA nine regional zones. Figure 9 shows the
regional distribution of the accidents according to the FAA regional zones. The Northwest
Mountain region contributed to 22.5% of the accidents. Next, the Central region, Great Lakes
region, and Southern region contributed to 17.5% of the accidents each. Alaska and Eastern
regions contributed to 7.5% of the accidents each, while New England and Western Pacific
regions contributed to 5% of the accidents each.
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Comparing the FAA GAATA survey10 from 2006 to 2009 to the accidents indicates that
there is no direct correlation between the number of accidents and fleet concentration in a region.
From 2006 to 2009, Southern region had the most day and night flight hours at 19.7%, while the
Southwest region was second with 17.1%. Southwest region recorded no icing accident from
2006 to 2010. The Northwest Mountain region, which recorded the highest number of accidents,
had 11.4% of the total day and night flight hours. This means that number of flight hours in a
region and number of accidents are not in direct proportion. IPS equipment, operation and
effectiveness, exposure to icing conditions, pilot’s management of events and decision making in
icing conditions are more important factors affecting the occurrence of inflight icing accidents.
4.2 NASA ASRS Data
Thirty inflight icing incidents were identified in the ASRS database. Ten of the incidents
involved aircraft with IPS systems that were operated during the icing event. The pilots operated
their IPS with an estimated ½ inch of ice build-up. This is the specification on most IPS
equipped aircraft; however, technology at this time cannot estimate the thickness of ice build-up.
When the IPS is ineffective pilots will report to ATC and ATC will advise them to either climb
or descend to an altitude that is free of icing conditions. The FAA8 explains that warmer altitudes
are not always below the flight’s altitude.
The most common event observed in the incident reports is performance degradation.
Twenty-three out of the 30 incidents were either unable to climb, maintain airspeed and altitude.
There was a single case in which a pilot descended to an unassigned altitude before
communicating with ATC. From the reports it appears that ATC has been very supportive in
guiding pilots out of icing conditions. Under serious conditions, ATC does not hesitate to declare
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an emergency even if the pilot fails to declare an emergency. The end result has been
predominantly safe landings at the nearest airport.
Nineteen of the incidents also reported accumulation of ice during the cruise phase of the
flight. This is analogous to the trend identified in the accident database. IMC accounted for 24 of
the incidents. Some pilots were amazed at the rate of ice accumulation even though they had
been in icing condition for only a few minutes. In some cases, as little as 2 - 5 minutes were
enough for pilots to describe the rate of ice accumulation as “very alarming”. Some pilots
reported that there were no reports of icing en route during their weather briefing, and therefore,
became overwhelmed when they found themselves accreting ice or in icing conditions.
4.3 Conclusions
1.

50% of the accidents occurred under zero surface precipitation at the accident site.
Snow and rain contributed to 10% each. Freezing rain, freezing drizzle, ice pellets and ice
crystals also contributed to 2.5% each, while 20% occurred under unknown surface
precipitation type. From 1978 to 20053 freezing precipitation and snow contributed to
33% and 32% respectively. This means that surface precipitation data alone is not enough
for inflight icing prediction. However, inflight precipitation condition is the determining
factor.

2.

Out of 40 accidents, 21 occurred under IMC, while 19 occurred under VMC. Out
of approximately 98.6 million total flight hours from 2006 to 2009, 86% were under
VMC, with the remaining 14% under IMC. This means that inflight icing is more
prevalent under IMC exposure than VMC. This was also the trend from 1978 to 2005.3
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3.

Approximately 62% of the accidents occurred at surface temperatures greater than
0oC, while 38% occurred at surface temperature less than or equal to 0oC. All of the
accidents occurred between +21oC and -21oC. This means that an aircraft is more likely
to experience inflight icing conducive temperature when there is a surface temperature
less than +21oC depending on the altitude it flies since temperature linearly decreases in
the troposphere.

4.

The Single Reciprocating Engine with 4 or more seats contributed to the greatest
percentage of the accidents. Sixteen of these accidents operated under FAA Part 91 as
general aviation aircraft. These aircraft were either not equipped with IPS or their IPS
status was unknown. IPS has been very useful in preventing inflight icing accidents.

5.

The 20 to 50 and 50+ twin turboprop engine aircraft and the single reciprocal
engine aircraft (1 to 3 seats) contributed to the least number of accidents. Most single
reciprocating engine aircraft are not equipped with IPS and completely avoid flying into
forecasted icing conditions. The 20 to 50 and 50+ category aircraft are mostly equipped
with IPS, which allow them to fly in moderate icing conditions. The rigorous training
requirements of pilots for these types of aircraft might have also contributed to the fewer
numbers of accidents.

6.

Aircraft in the cruise phase is more likely to accrete ice than any other phase. Ice
accretion in 40% of the accidents was detected during the cruise phase of the flights. This
is consistent with the trend from 1978 to 20053. This is because the cruise phase forms
the greatest duration of most air transportation.

7.

Although experience is very important in controlling aircraft under icing
conditions, there is no clear cut answer as to the amount of experience a pilot needs in
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icing conditions. Much depends on the intensity and type of ice accreted, the
effectiveness of the IPS and the pilot’s physical and emotional management of the
situation.
8.

Aircraft are more likely to experience stall/loss of control than any other
aerodynamic performance or stability and control event since icing increases the stall
speed. From 1978 to 2005 Mr. Green3 observed stall/loss of control in most of the
accidents than any other ASC events. Since the Roselawn accident, manufacturers were
instructed to specify the procedure for the selection of airspeed during icing conditions.

9.

Flight concentration or intensity in a region does not have a linear relationship to
inflight icing accidents. Although the Northwest Mountain recorded the highest number
of accidents, it only accounted for 11.4% of the total flight hours from 2006 to 2009. The
Alaskan region with only 2.8% of total flight hours recorded three accidents, while the
Southwest region with 17.1% of the total flight hours recorded no accident. IPS
equipment, operation and effectiveness, exposure to icing conditions, pilot’s management
of events and decision making in icing conditions are more important factors affecting
the occurrence of inflight icing accidents.
4.4 Recommendation
There is no clear cut answer as to how the various types of icing affect the flying
capabilities of an aircraft. Although a considerable amount of work has been done on the
effect of icing on aircraft’s aerodynamics, there is little information about how fast the
various types of icing affect the handling capabilities of an aircraft. Also, technology at
this time cannot predict the thickness, type and location of ice on an aircraft inflight.
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Future research in these areas will help to understand the problem further and manage
inflight icing more effectively.
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Appendix I
Modified GAATA Survey Scale Index
Table 1: Modified GAATA Survey Aircraft Scale Index, by Steven Green3
Scale Code

Scale Definition

1 RP: 1 – 3 seats

Single Reciprocating Engine, 1 to 3 seats

1 RP: 1 – 4+ seats

Single Reciprocating Engine, 4 or more seats

2 RP: 1 – 6 seats

Twin Reciprocating Engine, 1 to 6 seats

2 RP: 1 – 7+ seats

Twin Reciprocating Engine, 7 or more seats

2 TP: 1 – 12 seats

Twin Turboprop Engine, 1 to 12 seats

2 TP: 13+ seats

Twin Turboprop Engine, 13 or more seats (non-air carrier use)

2 TP: 13 – 19 seats

Twin Turboprop Engine, 13 to 19 seats (air carrier use)

2 TP: 20 – 50 seats

Twin Turboprop Engine, 20 to 50 seats (air carrier use)

2 TP: 50+ seats

Twin Turboprop Engine, 50 or more seats (air carrier use)
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Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the statistical measure of the meteorological parameters from
2006 to 2010, and 1978 to 2005 respectively.
Table 2: Statistical Measure of Surface Meteorological Parameters
Statistical
Measure

Surface
Temperature Wind
Temperature Dew-Point
Speed

Wind
Direction

Visibility

Ceiling

(oF)

(oF)

(Kts)

(Deg)

(sm)

(ft)

25 %tile

21.2

6.5

7

180

3

581.5

50 %tile

33.8

8

8

265

9

1600

75 %tile

47.3

14

14

310

10

2800

Table 3: Interquartile Model of Typical Icing Surface Observation, by Steven Green3
Statistical

Ceiling

Visibility

Measure

Temp

Temperature

Point spread

IQM

1000 feet

3.9 statute miles

0oC

1.75oC

1st Quartile

500 feet

2 statute miles

-2oC

1oC

3rd Quartile

2200 feet

7 statute miles

2oC

3.25oC
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–

Surface

Dew

Tables 4 and 5 respectively show the classification of the accident aircraft using the
GAATA scale index, and the 40 accidents from the NTSB online database.
Table 4: Classification of Aircrafts using Steven Green’s3 GAATA Modified Scale Index
Scale Code

Scale Definition

No
of
Aircrafts

1 RP: 1 – 3 seats

Single Reciprocating Engine, 1 to 3 seats

1

1 RP: 1 – 4+ seats

Single Reciprocating Engine, 4 or more seats

17

2 RP: 1 – 6 seats

Twin Reciprocating Engine, 1 to 6 seats

5

2 RP: 1 – 7+ seats

Twin Reciprocating Engine, 7 or more seats

5

2 TP: 1 – 12 seats

Twin Turboprop Engine, 1 to 12 seats

…

2 TP: 13+ seats

Twin Turboprop Engine, 13 or more seats (non-air carrier use)

…

2 TP: 13 – 19 seats

Twin Turboprop Engine, 13 to 19 seats (air carrier use)

…

2 TP: 20 – 50 seats

Twin Turboprop Engine, 20 to 50 seats (air carrier use)

1

2 TP: 50+ seats

Twin Turboprop Engine, 50 or more seats (air carrier use)

1
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Table 5: Details of Inflight Icing Accidents (2006 to 2010)

No

NTSB
REPORT ID

AIRCRAFT REG No

DATE

PLACE

1

CEN11CA135

N385AS

12/25/2010

Troy, MI

2

ERA11LA048

N7SY

11/5/2010

Winchester, TN

3

WPR11FA032

N201HF

10/25/2010

Lander, WY

4

ERA10LA105

N5118J

10/21/2010

Greenbush, ME

5

ERA10FA148

N7778W

2/23/2010

Springfield, KY

6

CEN10LA090

N206AV

1/6/2010

Kearney, NE

7

CEN10LA068

N108L

12/6/2009

Dodge City, KS

8

WPR10LA059

N2650R

11/20/2009

Susanville, CA

9

ANCO9LA038

N629SP

5/6/2009

Bethel, AK

10

CEN09LA206

N402BP

3/10/2009

Aberdeen, SD

11

DCA09MA027

N200WQ

2/12/2009

Clarence Center, NY

12

CEN09CA136

N6509T

1/17/2009

Lafayette, IN

13

CEN09FA135

N840NK

1/15/2009

Wray, CO

14

CEN09LA122

N92WT

1/6/2009

Three Rivers, MI

15

CEN09FA099

N9299N

12/19/2008

North Canton, OH

16

WPR09CA051

N6693A

11/29/2008

Rock River, WY

17

ANC09LAO12

N36CF

11/14/2008

Napaskiak, AK

18

NYCO8LA176

N101BX

5/8/2008

Snow Hill, NC

19

NYCO8FA139

C-FRSK

3/16/2008

Atkins, VA

20

SEA08LA072

N329BW

2/8/2008

Albany, OR
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Table 5 continued

No

NTSB
REPORT ID

AIRCRAFT REG No

DATE

PLACE

21

SEA08FA042

N925TT

12/10/2007

Salmon, ID

22

ANCO8CA020

N170BP

11/18/2007

Nikolai, AK

23

LAX08MA007

N430A

10/7/2007

Naches, WA

24

SEA08FA006

N85WT

10/7/2007

Ekalaka, MT

25

CH107FA183

N477MD

6/28/2007

Wellsville, MO

26

CH107FA102

N8969J

4/14/2007

Vibumum, MO

27

NYCO7LA081

N511AT

3/17/2007

Beverly, MA

28

ATLO7FA040

N506BC

2/9/2007

Hinesville, GA

29

DEN07FA059

N45GM

2/9/2007

Great Bend, KS

30

CH107LA059

N425TN

1/12/2007

Harbor Springs, MI

31

NYCO7FA051

N400CS

12/26/2006

Johnstown, PA

32

CH107FA046

N55MB

12/26/2006

Jasper, TN

33

CH107FA041

N9073P

12/17/2006

Bucyrus, OH

34

LAX07FA021

N121LD

10/25/2006

Meadview, AZ

35

DEN06FA131

N787SL

9/15/2006

Maybell, CO

36

CHI06IA127

N71MT

5/4/2006

Lincoln, NE

37

DEN06LA050

N33AFC

3/20/2006

Emporia, KS

38

SEA06FA147

N69KM

1/25/2006

Carson, WA

39

ATLO6LA035

N87HK

1/13/2006

Childersburg, AL

40

LAX061A076

N390AE

1/2/2006

Santa Maria, CA

33

Appendix II

Figure 1: Distribution of Events by Surface Precipitation Type

Figure 2: Distribution of Events by Phase of Flight.
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Figure 3: IPS Status and Operation

Figure 4: Distribution of Terminating Events
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Figure 5: Distribution of Total Flight Hours by Scale

Figure 6: Distribution of Events by FAA Part
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Figure 7: Distribution of Events by FAA Part and Total Flight Hours

Figure 8: Distribution of ASC Events by Scale
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Figure 9: Distribution of Events by FAA Regional Zoning
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